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Holwitt, Joel Ira. Execute Against Japan: The U.S.
Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press,
2009. 262pp. $37.50

Joel Ira Holwitt is a lieutenant who has
just completed the Submarine Officer
Advanced Course and will soon report
to USS New Mexico (SSN 779), in
Groton, Connecticut, as navigator. This
book was his PhD dissertation at Ohio
State University, where he studied under Dr. John Guilmartin. It is a serious
work that is researched in the tradition
of The Blue Sword (1982) by Dr. Mike
Vlahos, War Plan Orange (1991) by Edward Miller, and the more recent Agents
of Innovation (2008) by John Kuehn, all
of which deal with the interwar period
and the roles played by the War Plans
Division, the Naval War College, and
the General Board.
This book is an in-depth historical look
at how the United States and the U.S.
Navy’s decision-making process worked
in the run-up to Pearl Harbor. It is a
well documented and fascinating story
that brings to life some naval personalities perhaps not well known to today’s
officers. Most interesting for students at
the U.S. Naval War College and naval
officers who work in today’s interagency system, it is another look into
how the Navy’s leadership has functioned and the constructive role that
the Naval War College has played in influencing the thinking of the leadership.
Students of history and policy too will
find this an interesting story, not only
because the German decision to implement unrestricted submarine warfare
actually was one of the major causes for
the American entry into the First World
War but also because there appears to
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be no documentation indicating that
those leaders whom we would today call
the “national command authority” ever
actually participated in the decision to
implement this policy.
There exists a memorandum dated
March 1941 from Admiral Edward
Kalbfus (researched by Naval War College faculty and students), recommending a strategy of unrestricted submarine
and aerial warfare against Japan, that
was clearly rejected by the General
Board. The report, however, was retained by the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), Admiral Harold “Betty” Stark,
and it ultimately influenced his decision
to deliver the memo to the commander
of the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Thomas C.
Hart.
As a serving flag officer, I found it fascinating to see how real life worked in the
run-up to the war. For example, for me
the most interesting story was how the
CNO transmitted his “commander’s intent” to Admiral Hart, a most experienced submariner. Stark knew that the
State Department would never consent
to unrestricted submarine warfare and
so decided against raising the issue directly before the United States entered
the war. Instead, he sent a letter to Admiral Hart; Stark’s war planner, Rear
Admiral Kelly Turner, also discussed it
with Captain James Fife, another highly
respected submariner, who delivered
the information to Admiral Hart and
his staff personally in the Philippines.
There was no way that Admiral Hart
could mistake Stark’s intent. This put
Hart in a position to anticipate his orders, in a way the best commanders
will. Hart sent U.S. submarines to sea,
ready for war patrol, immediately after
the initial Japanese attack.
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The other interesting aspect of this
work deals with the difference between
prewar training of our submariners and
what they actually did in combat. In a
section called “The Accidental Commerce Raiders,” Holwitt points out that
commanders had been conditioned by
article 22 of the London Naval Treaty—
which many thought meant that if they
torpedoed merchants without warning,
they would actually be held liable,
“hunted down and captured or sunk as
pirates.” So, according to this account,
commanders were taught to be cautious
and were essentially trained for naval
combat against high-speed, heavily armored combatants and not against
commercial shipping. The result was
that very few of the tactics eventually
used were developed before the war.
Execute Against Japan should be required reading for naval officers (especially in submarine wardrooms), as well
as for anyone interested in history, policy, or international law. Lieutenant
Holwitt has already briefed some of our
Naval War College students. His research shows how and why our experience in the First World War did not
prepare us for the next one, and this is
its essential lesson. It is a lesson worth
some reflection.
REAR ADMIRAL JAMES P. WISECUP, U.S. NAVY
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Mueller, Michael. Canaris: The Life and Death of
Hitler’s Spymaster. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007. 320pp. $34.95

Who was Wilhelm Canaris? The naval
cadet from the Ruhr who rose to vice
admiral and directed the Abwehr,

German military intelligence, for nine
years remains one of the most intriguing figures in twentieth-century military history. German journalist and
documentarian Michael Mueller unravels several of the mysteries that surround Canaris’s life, though many
remain.
Mueller acknowledges the shortfall. Despite solid research and fresh archival
material, his account “neither answers
all the questions, nor resolves all the
contradictions.” The paucity of primary
sources and the tendency of intelligence
operators habitually to brush their
tracks owe much to the circumstances
of Canaris’s arrest and execution. Only
remnants survive of Canaris’s service
diaries, discovered by investigators in
the aftermath of the 20 July 1944 plot to
assassinate Hitler.
Mueller’s narrative informs, illuminates, and entertains. Canaris’s early career at sea was marked by escapades of
derring-do in South America and
Spain. An officer of his time, Canaris
absorbed the credo of the sea service,
and it served him well. He had a clear
talent for languages and social rapport,
and his superiors noted the vitality of
his wide-ranging networks. Before long,
he became “too valuable to send to
sea.”
An astute and calculating observer,
Canaris navigated multiple careerthreatening crises that began as the defeated German fleet returned to Kiel in
1918. In the closing years of the
Weimar Republic, Canaris again leveraged his luck, evading a series of potentially devastating political scandals. He
did not emerge unscathed, however; his
growing reputation made both naval officials and politicians nervous.
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